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 Essay, Digital Bowdlerizing: 
Removing the Naughty Bytes
by
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons1
bowd·ler·ize (b d l -r z ,boud -) tr.v. bowd·ler·ized,
bowd·ler·iz·ing, bowd·ler·iz·es  1. To expurgate (a book, for 
example) prudishly 2. To modify, as by shortening or 
simplifying or by skewing the content in a certain manner.2
I. INTRODUCTION
“During the Victorian era, the prevailing delicacy of the age inspired Dr. 
Thomas Bowdler and his sister to edit Shakespeare’s plays to make them 
suitable for ‘family reading.’ All off-color jokes and sexual matter were 
removed. The word bowdlerize entered the language as a synonym for 
militant prudery.”3  Luckily for Dr. Bowdler and his sister, the works of 
Shakespeare were clearly in the public domain. The modern Dr. Bowdlers 
and their accomplices do not share Dr. Bowdler’s luck, however. When 
they abridge modern digital works to remove content that is offensive to the 
conscience of their constituencies, their reward for this “public service” is 
allegations of, and possible liability for, copyright infringement.4  Other 
modern Bowdlers modify software by deleting portions of code to add new 
capabilities.  These deletions are often only shocking to the conscience or 
the pocketbook of the copyright owner. The legal rights being asserted by 
copyright owners represent a common threat to the use of copyrighted 
works in the private sphere.  Yet, these deletions convey significant 
advantages to the user or consumer of bowdlerized works. Digital 
bowdlerization makes available works that are inherent in cultural literacy, 
to all age groups and delicacy of conscience. 
Unlike Dr. Bowdler, who republished the works of Shakespeare with 
the naughty bits removed, the modern digital Bowdlerizer deletes offensive 
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content from digital works in a variety of ways.  This Essay will analyze the 
technologies used by the modern Bowdlerizer to determine when, if, and 
which technologies make copies in violation of the copyright owner’s § 
106(1) right to control reproduction or make derivative copies of a 
preexisting work that may infringe the copyright owner’s 17 U.S.C. § 
106(2) right to authorize the creation of derivative works.  These 
technologies not only support militant prudery,5 but they also may add new 
functionality and capabilities that expand consumer choice.  The answer to 
many of these technological, social, and legal problems is a careful 
consideration of the scope of the derivative work right in a digital economy 
rather than the traditional approach of waiting until infringement. This 
Essay proposes a test to determine whether a technology produces a 
derivative work.  This Essay concludes that the balance of the equities and 
the public policies behind the copyright law protect digital bowdlerizing.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY OF BOWDLERIZING
Many technologies modify the copyrighted content in digital works.  
While the actual technologies may vary, they can largely be categorized as 
techniques that physically change the media and techniques that intercept 
the signal that change the display but not the media. Each of these 
techniques raises serious questions of copyright infringement. Since 
violation of the Copyright Act may depend on the technological process that 
removes or alters the digital display, this section will describe some 
representative models.
A. Editing the Digital Work (Physically)
One method of digital bowdlerizing requires the Bowlderizer to 
purchase a copy of the work. The work is then physically altered so that an 
edited copy is produced. The work is edited so that the underlying magnetic 
or other media no longer physically contains scenes or content that is 
offensive.  Usually, the Bowdlerizer purchases one copy that will be altered 
(“edited”). The altered copy then becomes a master copy, and it is recorded 
on to subsequent “original” copies purchased from authorized distributors.  
5
 Cleanflicks Update: The Battle Continues, DGA Magazine, March 2003, 
http://www.dga.org/news/v27_6/news_digitalpiracy4.php3 (“Not even subtlety is a guarantee against 
surgical manhandling, however. A scene from Redford's The Horse Whisperer depicts Redford doing 
a tender slow dance with co-star Kristin Scott Thomas that features his hand touching her back. 
Thomas' character is married to another man, and the FamilyFlix cut of the film completely 
eliminates this dance, despite its import in illustrating her character's struggle with her marriage and 
her attraction to another man.”).  In candor, they also cut from Good Will Hunting, 130 F-words and 
75 miscellaneous curse words. See Film-censoring software angers entertainment industry, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 3, 2003. http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-02-03-film-
censors_x.htm. The movie ran 126 minutes or one offensive word approximately every 36 seconds of 
the movie.
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Other companies, will produce a Bowdlerized copy and ship it along with 
the original copy to the purchaser so that two copies exist, the original 
authorized by the copyright owner and the Bowdlerized copy as edited.
B. Editing the Digital Work (Virtually)
Other popular techniques allow modern Bowdlers to “ellipse” offensive 
content,6 this section will describe two representative technologies.  Some 
companies use a digital template edits. The effect of the digital template is 
similar to that of editing a motion picture for television or airline use.  A 
computer program is created that causes the DVD software to skip time 
sequences that are matched to offensive content in the original.7  Offensive 
audio content is muted.8 This method requires that the viewer 
simultaneously use both the digital template and an original copy of the 
DVD.9  This software is in the early stages of its evolution. Currently, it is 
more readily available to use on a personal computer with a DVD drive.  
Nevertheless, some companies are already selling home DVD player with 
the capabilities of running digital templates.10  Accordingly, this technology 
is becoming easier to use and more widely available for individual home 
use.
A competing technology digitally alters films to “make them more 
family friendly, skipping violent or sexual content and toning down 
language.”11 This technology permits the Bowdlerizer to “drape a modest 
negligee over Kate Winslet during her nude scene in Titanic.” Or to 
“reshoot” Gone With Wind’s famous closing line from “Frankly, my dear I 
don’t give a damn” to “Frankly, my dear I don’t give a darn” or even “I 
could careless.”
III. COPYRIGHT OWNER’S § 106 RIGHTS
The creative and financial forces in Hollywood are not taking this threat 
to their cultural monopoly on entertainment lightly.  These forces of artistic 
indignation and freedom are leading a litigation charge asserting claims 
6
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infringement under the color of copyright law.  In order to sue for copyright 
infringement, a copyright owner must show that one of the owner’s § 106 
rights were violated.12  The Copyright Act distinguishes between two types 
of ownership interests:  ownership in the copyright and ownership of the 
tangible work that embodies the copyrighted work.13  Under the Copyright 
Act, an owner of a copyrighted work has certain exclusive rights to that 
work.14  For our purposes, the two most significant rights are the right 
§106(1) to reproduce the work15 and §106(2) to prepare derivative works.16
In order to state a claim for copyright infringement, the copyright owner 
must demonstrate that she has a validly copyrighted work and that the 
alleged infringer copied protected elements from the work in breach of one 
or more of the copyright owners §106 rights.17 Bowdlerizations potentially 
may contravene one, several, or even all of the copyright owner’s § 106 
rights.18 Furthermore, the creation of an bowdlerization potentially infringes 
12 M. David Dobbins, Note Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability For Users' Infringing 
Acts, 94 MICH. L. REV. 217, 220-21 (1995); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON  COPYRIGHT § 8.
13 17 U.S.C. § 202; Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990);
Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV.
511, 538 n. 94 (1997).
1417 U.S.C. § 106; John Kheit, Public Performance Copyrights: A Guide to Public Place 
Analysis, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1999). 
15
 17 U.S.C. §106(1) (“to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;”).
16
 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2) (“to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;”).  
The copyright owners public performance (§106(3)) and display rights (§106(4) are not within the 
scope of this paper. Since the copyright owner’s rights are limited to those provided for in § 106, 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists TV, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393-95 (1968), and the right is limited to 
“public performances.” See. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) & 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). “To perform or display a work 
''publicly'' means . . to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is 
gathered.” 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Clearly to the degree that these bowdlerizations are used within the 
privacy of one’s home or similar place limited to the normal circle of family and friends, there has 
not been a public performance. See Twentieth Cent. Music Corp. v. Aiklen, 422 U.S. 151, 155 
(1975); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 468-69 
(1984)(Blackmum, J. dissenting); Kheit, supra note 14, at _____.; Dan Thu Thi Phan, Note Will Fair 
Use Function On The Internet, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 178 n. 61 (1998).  Further, under the first 
sale doctrine, once the copyright owner has sold a copy, subsequent purchasers are free to sell, rent, 
or lease digital works.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109.  This does not apply to computer programs.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 109(c).  Other rights include 17 U.S.C. §106(3) (“to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending;”). 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (“in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly;”). 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (“in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;”);
17 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).  “Copying is a 
‘shorthand reference to the act of infringing any of the copyright owner’s five exclusive rights set fort 
at 17 U.S.C. § 106.’”  Dun & Bradstreet Software Serv., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 
206 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 
1991)).
18
 There does note appear to be a neutral term to describe these new types of works that does not 
appear to at least prejudge the ultimate outcome of the analysis.  The Essay uses the term 
bowdlerization without prejudicing the ultimate conclusion as to whether these new independent 
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the copyright owner’s § 106 exclusive rights in one or more independently 
copyrighted works, the source code, object code, or audio-visual expression 
of the code.19  Which rights, if any that have been violated, is a highly fact 
and technology specific determination that requires a court to carefully 
examine the interaction of the original digital work, the alleged infringing 
bowdlerization, the firmware,20 and the subsequent creation.  Infringement 
of these exclusive rights may subject the infringer to liability unless the 
infringement is otherwise excused under the Copyright Act.21
A. Section 106(1) Reproduction Rights
The creation of a digital bowdlerization clearly implicates the copyright 
owner’s right to reproduce the work.22  In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc.,23 the Court found that computer files created by a 
disassembly program, printouts of the disassembled code, modifications 
generated during reverse engineering, and other intermediate copying 
violated the copyright owner’s § 106(1) right to authorize reproductions.24
Thus, the creative process leading to the design of the bowdlerization may 
result in intermediate copies of the work that violate the copyright owner’s 
§106(1) right of reproduction unless otherwise permissible under the 
Copyright Act.25
The iterative test is used to determine substantial similarity in cases 
where there is an allegation of literal copying.
The iterative approach requires proof (1) that the defendant 
‘used’ the copyrighted work in preparing the alleged copy, 
which may be established by proof of access and similarity 
sufficient to reasonably infer use of the copyrighted work; 
and (2) that the defendant's work is an iterative reproduction, 
supplementary works “bowdlerizations” are also derivative works.
19 NIMMER ON INFORMATION LAW ¶ 11:130.
20
 Firmware is “[c]omputer programming instructions that are stored in a read-only memory unit 
rather than being implemented through software.”
2117 U.S.C. §§ 501, 504 (19XX).
22
 Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of New 
Technologies, 4 J. OF SMALL & EMERG. BUS. L. 57, 71-74 (2000).
23
 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
24 977 F.2d at 1518; Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, 
and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1014-
1026 (1993).
25 See generally Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp, 203 F.3d 596, 599-602 
(9th Cir. 2000) (describing in detail the various techniques that are used in reverse engineering).  The 
copying does not have to be substantial in a quantitative sense. See Dun & Bradstreet Software 
Services, Inc., 307 F.3d at 208 (suggesting that copying twenty-seven lines out of 525,000 lines of 
code may be sufficient).
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that is, one produced by iterative or exact duplication of 
substantial portions of the copyrighted work.26
The first prong of the iterative test is worthless in the context of mass-
market software that is readily available in the marketplace.  So, access may 
be presumed. The second prong “divides programs into protected literal 
code, protected literal translations of code, and the unprotected remainder of 
the program.”27  This test may be significant to determine the status of 
intermediate works that are prepared as part of the process that removes 
offensive content. For example, most DVD or VHS copies of movies are 
distributed and sold for private home viewing.  This would not appear to 
include the right to commercial viewing for the purposes of creating a 
digital template. If temporary copies are loaded into RAM so that they may 
be digitally edited or even to facilitate timing the motion picture so that 
associated software templates may more effectively bowdlerize the film, 
these intermediate working copies may violate the copyright owner’s § 
106(1) rights unless otherwise excused as a fair use.  
This test is extremely useful in determining whether the process by 
which the digital bowdlerization was created in itself violated the copyright 
owners  § 106(1) rights.  Other than literal copying of protected code or 
merely translating software between programming languages, this test is 
unhelpful to determine if an bowdlerization is an infringing work. The 
iterative test may not be as useful in determining whether the product itself 
is an unlawful reproduction.  This Essay focuses on bowdlerizations that 
add-value (originality) to the underlying work.  This originality may be 
expressed in what and how the bowdlerizer edits the original work to 
produce the new digital bowdlerized work. These bowdlerizations are 
unlikely to be merely literal copying but rather putative derivative works 
that should be analyzed under § 106(2) of the Copyright Act.28
B. Section 106(2) Derivative Work Rights
Perhaps, the most significant question is whether these technologies of 
Bowdlerizing create unauthorized derivative works under the Copyright Act 
or do they create integrated works that are not infringing.  Section 106(2) 
grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to “to prepare derivative 
26
 E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485,1493 (D. Minn. 1985) 
(citing Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial 
Similarity Test, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1294-1300 (1984)).
27
 John W.L. Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under Learned Hand's 
Abstractions Test In Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MICH.  L.  REV. 526, 550 (1992).
28
 This Essay only discusses the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act tangentially.  If finding 
that the resulting derivative work is transformative, then the courts are likely to excuse the 
intermediate copying.  If the digital work is a computer program, the modifications are essential to its 
use, and the modifier is also an owner of a copy of the program, then the intermediate copy is likely 
to be excused in 17 U.S.C. § 117.  In either cases, further discussion of fair use is outside the scope of 
this Essay. 
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works based upon the copyrighted work[.]”29 “A derivative work consists of 
a contribution of original material to a pre-existing work so as to recast, 
transform or adapt the pre-existing work.”30 “Simply transferring a work 
from one media [sic] to another, e.g., digitizing a work or copying a bound 
text into a photocopy is not the creation of a derivative work . . . . 
Additional original, copyrightable material must be added to the original 
work in order to create a derivative work, i.e., a second work is derived 
from the first.”31  Unlike derivative works, “integrated works do not copy 
any of the digital bits of the copyrighted work or any other copyrightable 
elements of the digital material that may be necessary for the integrated 
work to serve its intended purposes.”32 If the court finds that the 
bowdlerization is an integrated work or is otherwise not a derivative work, 
then the bowdlerization does not infringe the copyright owner’s right to 
authorize derivative works and no further analysis will be needed.33
This Essay recommends that a court use the following analysis to 
determine if the bowdlerization is also a derivative work.  The test is 
designed to protect the copyright owner’s economic incentives and to assure 
a robust zone of public use rights.  Some of these elements are similar to the 
factors a court will consider as part of a § 107 fair use defense.  A careful 
weighing of the statutory definition, public policy, and case law interpreting 
the definition of a derivative work may terminate the litigation prior to the 
Court’s engaging in a “fair use” analysis.  For public policy reasons, the 
copyright owner must carry her burden of proof to demonstrate that she has 
a protectable property interest in the accused derivative work before the 
court determines whether creating the accused infringing work is otherwise 
excused under copyright law.  Absent such an a priori determination, a 
court may erroneously make a leap from copying or use (“sweat of the 
brow”) to a false determination of infringement.34
“The statutory language is hopelessly overbroad, however, for ‘[e]very 
book in literature, science, and art, borrows and must necessarily borrow, 
and use much which was well knew and used before.’”35  There is no bright 
29
 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, 
or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative 
work”. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
30 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §3:03.
31 JOHN KENNEDY, ET AL., 1 INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:11 [hereinafter KENNEDY ON 
INTERNET LAW].
32
 Loren, supra note 22, at 66.
33
 Loren, supra note 22, at 85.
34
 For example, the alleged infringing work may have copied functional elements or other 
unprotectable expressions from the pre-existing work.
35 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc, 154 F.3d 1107, 1110  (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Emerson v. Davies,
8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436), quoted in 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.01, at 3-
2 (1997)); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 409, 430 (2002) (“It is 
commonplace that new works draw from and build upon old ones.  No work is purely and complete 
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line rule to determine when an bowdlerization or modification of a digital 
product rises to the level of creating a derivative work.  For example, as 
integrated works, software add-ons such as spell checkers, dictionaries, 
grammar checking programs, do not become derivative works merely 
because they are designed to work as a module of a copyrighted work 
unless the add-on itself incorporates protected copyrighted works.36 This 
Essay also contends that software programs that delete all or part of a signal 
or substitute a signal are not derivative works.  Unless it incorporates a 
substantial portion of the pre-existing work merely because the pre-existing 
work is routed through a system that alters it is not sufficient.  Obviously, 
“[a]ll works are derived to a certain degree from pre-existing works.”37
The customary test for a derivative work is not well thought-out to 
achieve an optimal result when applied in the digital environment.  Under 
the economic incentive paradigm used to justify copyright protection, there 
are two legitimate reasons to grant copyright owners control over derivative 
works.  First by enlarging the copyright grant, the copyright owner has 
greater incentive to produce new works.38  Second, derivative works 
potentially impair the market for the pre-existing work by acting as a 
market substitute.39   Any curb on the definition of a derivative work should 
protect these foundation interests without trespassing on the public’s right 
of access to and use of the copyright work.  
IV. PROPOSED TEST OF AN INFRINGING DIGITALLY BOWDLERIZED WORK
   In the context digital works, this Essay purposes the following a four-
factor test for determining whether the accused work is an infringing 
derivative work.40 In order to determine that an accused work is derivative 
work under § 106(2); a court should consider whether the accused work: (1) 
incorporates copyrightable content from the primary or underlying work; 
(2) is "embodied in a concrete form;" (3) is "substantially similar" to the 
new.  All works draw upon prior works, to at least some extent.”).
36 NIMMER ON INFORMATION LAW, ¶ 4:56; Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
964 F.2d 965, ___ (9th Cir. 1992).
37
 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
38
 Loren, supra note 22, at 76.
39
 Loren, supra note 22, at 76.
40
 The case law is not clear on whether this is an element, factor, or some sui generis hybrid test.  
Since at least some of these criterion must be met, for example the alleged infringing work must be 
embodied in a concrete form, and the alleged infringing work must be either substantially similar or 
incorporate protectable copyrighted content, this Essay presumes that this is an elements test. See 
Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110 (listing two of out of the four suggested “criteria a work must satisfy in 
order to qualify as a derivative work. One of these is that a derivative work must exist in a "concrete 
or permanent form," and must substantially incorporate protected material from the preexisting 
work,”)(internal citations omitted)(emphasis supplied). But see, Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with 
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 562 (1997) (“the definition of 
derivative works does not require that they be fixed.  Thus, those who alter a copyrighted work in 
RAM memory may face liability under § 106(2) . . . .”).  This Essay proposes a factor test and to 
leave the weighing of the factors to the sound discretion of the trial court.
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primary work; and (4) supplants or satisfies market demand for the 
protected expression fixed in the primary work.41  This test is based on the 
factors, the court first articulated in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. but redefines 
some of the elements so that the test is more nuanced and balanced. Only 
after finding that the copyright owner has a protectable copyright interest in 
the accused work that the burden shifts to the defendant and the § 107 fair 
use factors may be examined in light of the evidence adduced by the 
defendant as part of the defendant’s affirmative defense.. 
A. Derivative Works Must Incorporate Copyrightable Content
First, the court must distinguish between unauthorized reproductions 
under § 106(1) and the unauthorized creation of a derivative work under § 
106(2).  For a derivative work to be protected there must be a 
distinguishable difference from the pre-existing work that is more than 
merely trivial.42  Some courts have omitted or overlooked the statutory 
requirement that the work have some modicum of originality before it may 
be found to be a derivative work.43  These courts do this by unduly 
construing the statutory language of “recast, transformed or adapted” while 
disregarding the constraint that the “modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship.”44  Worse, these courts have 
fashioned two definitions of derivative works, one for creating a new 
derivative work for the purposes of copyright registration and another for 
the infringement of another’s copyright.45  For example, in the Ninth 
Circuit, a party seeking to register a copyright must show originality and 
fixation in a tangible medium of expression; “yet, a party bringing a 
copyright action for an alleged infringement of its exclusive rights to create 
derivative works need not.”46
This approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit poses at least two problems. Such a bifurcated definition produces 
an inordinate risk that “courts will naively apply this broad definition to 
find activities infringing that are more properly viewed as altogether beyond 
the scope of copyright.”47 As one court found, the cases that read the 
41
 Edward G. Black and Michael H. Page, Add-On Infringements: When Computer Add-Ons And 
Peripherals Should (And Should Not) Be Considered Infringing Derivative Works Under Lewis 
Galoob Toys, Inc. V. Nintendo Of America, Inc., And Other Recent Decisions, 15 HASTINGS 
COMM/ENT L.J. 615, 621 (1993). Cf. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 964 F.2d at 965-69; Micro Star, 154 
F.3d at 1110.
421 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3:03; Asia Entertainment v. Nguyen, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17792, *5 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
43 See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 
1988).
44 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576, 580-81 (N. Ill. 1986).
45
 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1992).
46
 925 F. Supp. at 581 (citing Lewis Galoob Toy’s, Inc., 964 F.2d at 967-68).
47
 925 F. Supp. at 581 (quoting Black & Page, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
628-29).
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originality requirement out of the definition of a derivative work, “open the 
door for the most trivial of modifications to generate an infringing 
derivative work.”48  Further, such an analysis flouts the clear intent of 
Congress as expressed in the statutory definition of a derivative work.49
The better approach is that of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Woods v. Bourne Co.50  “In order for a work to qualify as 
a derivative work, it must be independently copyrightable. The basis for 
copyright protection contained in both the constitution and the Copyright 
Act is originality of authorship.”51
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that 
the work was independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at 
least some minimal degree of creativity . . .. To be sure, the 
requisite level of creativity is low; even a slight amount will 
suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, “no matter how 
crude, humble or obvious” it might be. . . . .52
 The “original aspects of a derivative work must be more than trivial.”53
Further, “the requirement of originality [cannot] be satisfied simply by the 
demonstration of ‘physical skill’ or ‘special training’ . . . .”54  For example, 
copying the works of the great masters may require physical skill and 
special training, but it does not entitle the copier to a copyright in the copy 
of the original.55 The standard applied in the case of a derivative work must 
be the higher standard of true artistic skill.56
If the accused infringing derivative work meets the originality standard, 
then the court must evaluate whether the accused infringing work 
incorporates copyrightable content from the preexisting work.57  This is the 
48
 971 F. Supp. at 69.
49
 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Perhaps, “flout” is too strong a term. There is language in the Notes of 
the Committee of the Judiciary that  “The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . . overlaps the 
exclusive right of reproduction to some extent.  It is broader than that right . . . in the sense that 
reproduction requires fixation in copies . . . whereas . . . a derivative work, such as ballet, pantomime 
. . . may be an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed . . ..” H.R. Rep. No. 146, 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5675.  Nevertheless, under the 1976 Copyright Act, other provisions of § 106 
prohibit the activities described in the legislative history and it does a disservice to the Copyright Act 
to needlessly expand the scope of § 106(2) to prevent copying that is prohibited elsewhere in § 106.
50 60 F.3d 978, 989 (2d Cir. 1995).
51
 60 F.3d. at 989 (internal citations omitted).
52
 Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Service, 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).
53
 60 F.3d. at 989 (internal citations omitted).
54
 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 857 (1976).
55 See Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F. Supp. 2d 216, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
56 L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 491; Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d 
Cir. 1980)
57 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc, 154 F.3d 1107, 1110  (9th Cir. 1998); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 972 [check this pinpoint] (9th Cir. 1992); Litchfield v. 
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key element that will separate an integrated work from a derivative work.  
This requires an assessment of the “qualitative value of the copied material, 
both to the originator and to the plagiarist.”58 There does not appear to be 
any concrete method of measuring this factor. Courts have considered the 
quantity of the copying and found that “the fact that a substantial portion of 
the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value
of the copied material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist who seeks 
to profit from marketing someone else's copyrighted expression.”59
However, the quantity of the copying is less significant than the qualitative 
nature of the copying.60  Almost certainly, the best way conceptualize this 
factor is as some ratio between quantity and quality delineating the frontier 
between permissible and impermissible uses.  The exact ratio in each case is 
context and market specific to the facts of the dispute.  
To determine the qualitative aspects of the work, the court seeks to find 
the heart of the work.  The heart of the work is the original expressive 
elements that give the work its utmost value.  Here, the original expressive 
elements of the software give the software its market value.  This will 
require expert testimony to distinguish between prosaic, trivial expressions 
or functional elements and original expression, and then to take the next 
step to determine the qualitative significance of the copied expression.  For 
example, what at first blush may appear to be creative original expression 
may represent merely a translation between programming languages or 
merely a “mechanical” change in variables.  Courts should avoid the 
tautological definition of qualitative value.  Some courts have fallen into the 
logical fallacy that if the original expression was used then it must also be 
qualitatively significant without making an independent valuation. Rather, 
courts must determine whether the amount copied is “reasonable in relation 
to the purpose of the copying.”61
B. Derivative Works Must be in a Concrete Form 
A derivative work must be in a embodied in a concrete or permanent 
form,62 but the derivative work does not have to by “fixed” as defined under 
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984); Black & Page, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 622; Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-1476.
58
 Dun & Bradstreet Software Services, Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 208 (3rd 
Cir.  2002) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 
(1985)).
59 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
60 Dun & Bradstreet, 307 F.3d at  208.
61
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994).  Properly analyzed this factor 
may reveal whether "a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim" from the 
copyrighted work is a relevant question for it may reveal a dearth of transformative character or 
purpose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market harm under the fourth; a work 
composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely 
to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.” 510 U.S. at 588 (internal citations 
omitted).
62 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 964 F.2d at 967.
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the Copyright Act.63  Section 102(2) grants the copyright owner the right 
“to prepare” derivative works.64  If Congress intended the derivative work 
right to require fixation, Congress would have provided the copyright owner 
with the right “to create” derivative works.65  But, all of the examples of 
derivative works in the Copyright Act presuppose a physical or concrete 
form.66  “The legislative history similarly indicates that ‘the infringing work 
must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.’”67
“Incorporate” suggests the embodiment into some tangible form. 
Consequently, an independent fixation requirement has been read into the 
statutory definition of a derivative work.68
This element of the derivative work test may be problematic depending 
on the technology.  If the fixation is embodied in the bowdlerization then 
this element is potentially satisfied. However, if the bowdlerization fixes the 
derivative work in the memory associated with some other device or 
memory location then potentially the device will not infringe.
Many add-on programs run in a memory resident mode 
wherein the add-on and the primary program are both stored 
at different memory locations in the same computer and a 
single integrated program is never created or stored in 
memory. . . . [Alternatively] computer programs may operate 
by creating integrated works that are stored only at 
temporary memory locations and are erased every time the 
program is completed.69
The results of a legal test to determine a derivative work should be 
technology neutral when appropriate and not depend on the sophistication 
of software engineers or serendipitous choice of technology in products.  
Memory resident programs may be the copyright equivalent of 
preprogramming a compact disc player to play a compact disc in some 
prearranged or random order that departs from the order selected by the 
author. Programs stored in temporary memory locations as the program is 
being executed may be the equivalent of the “evanescent screen displays” 
63 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111.
64
 17 U.S.C. § 102(2). Evan Finkel, Update To: Copyright Protection For Computer Software In 
The Nineties, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 99, 102 (1992); Carol S. Curme, Note, 
Derivative Works Of Video Game Displays: Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. V. Nintendo Of Am., Inc., 964 
F.2D 965 (9th Cir. 1992), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1022 (1993). I. Trotter Hardy, Jr., Six Copyright 
Theories For The Protection Of Computer Object Programs, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 845, 855 (1984) 
(“Nothing in the definition requires that a derivative work be fixed in a tangible medium”).
65
 Finkel, supra note 64, at 102.
66 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111; Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 864 F.2d at 967-68; Black & Page, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 625.
67 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 964 F.2d at 967 (quoting 1976 U.S. Code & Admin. News 5659, 
5675).  
68 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111; Precious Moments, Inc. v. La Infantil, Inc., 971 F. Supp 66, 68 
(D. PR 1997).
69
 Black & Page, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 614-15.
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that Courts have found to be too ephemeral to constitute derivative works.70
This creates a perverse situation where the process by which the accused 
derivative work is created is more significant that either the work or the 
effect of the work on the copyright system of incentives to create new 
works.   Perhaps the simplest solution is to reject the metaphysical 
examination of fixation in favor of a pragmatic test recognizing that if a 
copy exists long enough for the computer to use that copy or if that copy 
can be readily recreated whenever necessary or desired, then that copy is 
suitably fixed for the rationale of the Copyright Act.
C. Derivative Works Must be Substantially Similar
The alleged infringing derivative work must be substantially similar to 
the preexisting work.71  “Similarity of expression focuses on the response of 
the ordinary reasonable person, and considers the total concept and feel of 
the works.”72  In essence, this test studies the elasticity of demand of the 
alleged infringing derivative work as a substitute for the pre-existing 
work.73
The analysis applied in the Ninth Circuit to determine 
substantial similarity can be roughly summarized as a four-
step process: (1) the works at issue are analytically dissected 
with the aid of expert testimony into component elements; 
(2) the elements are individually analyzed for protectability, 
and unprotected ideas, processes, functions, scenes à faire, 
and so forth are excluded; (3) the court, again with the aid of 
expert testimony, determines if the works are "extrinsically" 
or "objectively" substantially similar; and (4) the trier of fact 
determines if the works are "intrinsically" or "subjectively" 
substantially similar.74
The fourth element of the Ninth Circuit test, the “ordinary observer” test 
has been criticized in the context of computer software.75  In Whelan 
70
 Black & Page, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 625-26.
71 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc, 154 F.3d 1107, 1111  (9th Cir. 1998).
72 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111.  See Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The 
Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 766 (1987) (Substantial 
similarity test rejects expert testimony and analysis, blurs the lines between protected and unprotected 
expression, and does not define when similarity is substantial);
73 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural And Economic Analysis Of 
The Betamax Case And Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1643-44 & n. 237 (1982); Glynn 
S. Lunney, Jr. , Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 517-
19 & N. 141 (1996); Cf. Christian H. Nadan, A Proposal to Recognize Component Works: How A 
Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1633, 1642-1644 (1990).
74
 Black & Page, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 630 n. 45 (citing Brown Bag 
Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992)); 
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir.1990).
75
 Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d 1986); 
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Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, the Third Circuit concluded that 
the ordinary observer section of the substantial similarity test was not 
suitable for the multifaceted computer program copyright case before it. 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Becker reasoned that the complexity 
of computer programs, combined with the public’s unfamiliarity with such 
programs, rendered the ordinary observer test absurd.76  The Seventh 
Circuit held that 
only a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a 
court to embrace a doctrine that requires a copyright case to 
turn on the opinion of someone who is ignorant of the 
relevant differences and similarities between two works. 
Instead, the judgment should be informed by people who are 
familiar with the media at issue.77
Inherent in the nature of software interoperability and other digital 
works, many bowdlerizations or add-ons will have a significant similarity of 
expression.  This similarity of expression will be imposed not by expressive 
or creative choice or lack thereof, but rather through the requirements of the 
operating code of the preexisting work or the functional requirements of the 
market.  For example, binary code must be O’s, and 1’s each programming 
language has its own syntax, many applications must have the same data 
fields, and of course nesting hierarchies of menus may not be protected.78
These types of similarities are irrelevant to determining similarity of 
expression. The substantial similarity test fails in the case of 
bowdlerizations that function as add ons. There should be substantial 
similarity between a word-processor with a spell-check program or the 
Game Genie. Consequently, the preferred test is a unitary one that 
collapses the extrinsic and intrinsic tests and incorporates expert 
testimony.79 Courts should adopt “a single substantial similarity inquiry 
according to which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible.”80
The focus when applying this unitary test is making “mak[ing] a qualitative, 
not quantitative, judgment about the character of the work as a whole and 
the importance of the substantially similar portions of the work.”81
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985).
76
 Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Whelan Assoc., Inc., 
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)).
77 Dawson, 905 F.2d at 735.
78 William F. Patry, Copyright And Computer Programs: It's All In The Definition, 14 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (1996).
79 Whelan Associates, Inc, 797 F.2d 1233 (“ordinary observer test is not useful and is potentially 
misleading when the subjects of the copyright are particularly complex, such as computer programs. 
We therefore join the growing number of courts which do not apply the ordinary observer test in 
copyright cases involving exceptionally difficult materials, like computer programs, but instead adopt 
a single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert testimony would be 
admissible.”)
80
 797 F.2d at 1233 (citations omitted).
81 797 F.2d at 1245 (citations omitted).
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D. Derivative Works must Supplant or Satisfy Market Demands
A requirement that a court considers is whether the derivative works 
supplant or satisfy market demands marks a departure from traditional 
derivative work analysis.  This new factor is particularly significant in the 
context of bowdlerizations or add-ons. Consequently, this element must 
focus on whether the bowdlerization represents technology by improvement 
or by replacement. If the bowdlerization enhances but does not replace or 
recast the copyrighted work then the bowdlerization does not infringe the 
rights of the copyright owner.  
This point may be illustrated by two examples.  A motion picture that is 
an bowdlerization or derivative work of a novel may be a market substitute 
for the pre-existing work. Seeing the motion picture may substitute for 
purchasing the novel. This would result in the copyright owner loosing her 
copyright incentive.  However, a consumer would not find a word-
processing program with a spell checker to be substantially similar to a 
stand-alone spell checker. Sales of the stand-alone spell checker creates a 
market for word processing programs without spell checkers but does not 
substitute for a word processing program. Spell checkers broaden the 
functionality of a word-processing program but do not substitute for owning 
one.  In this case, the copyright owner would receive her economic 
incentive under the Copyright Act.
Whether there is a likelihood that the copyright owner would enter into 
the market for the bowdlerization or license others to satisfy the market for 
derivative work is one factor of the test for whether the bowdlerization is an 
infringing derivative work.  “[T]he ‘potential market’ for the [preexisting 
work] is limited to markets for the existing copyrighted work, and any 
attempt by the copyright [owner of the preexisting work] to control the use 
of products that add new features or operations to the [preexisting work] 
runs counter to the purposes of copyright and should prevent a copyright 
[owner] from defeating a claim of fair use.”82  Markets that may only be 
exploited using the new features are not preexisting markets to the 
copyright owner. 
A court may examine whether this sort of bowdlerization is one that is 
usually licensed or made by the copyright owner.  Even if it is a market 
usually exploited by the copyright owner, the longer the time between the 
initial marketing of the copyrighted work and the copyright owner’s 
exploitation of the derivative work market, the less likely that this particular 
copyright owner would be to exploit the market.  Courts should be free not 
only to examine the theoretical markets but also those that this particular 
82
 Black & Page, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 642-43; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
593 “In considering the fourth factor, our concern is not whether the secondary use suppresses or 
even destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary 
use usurps or substitutes for the market of the original work.”); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524;  
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copyright owner would actually exploit.  In the case of an unique software 
product with no market track record on which to establish the value of, or 
even need for, subsequent bowdlerizations or derivative works, the 
copyright owner should be given more time to develop these new markets.  
In either case, the copyright owner bears the responsibility of showing that 
there is a reasonable probability that she will enter into the new market or 
that the bowdlerization competes in a market she already exploits.
This may appear to change the law that the defendant has the burden of 
proof to show an affirmative defense of fair use.83  At first, this may seem 
like an anomaly but in actually, courts often place the burden of 
demonstrating a negative that there is no fair use defense on the plaintiff 
when the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction.84 The reality is that absent 
a property interest, the defendant has no obligation to defend. Therefore, 
proving that this accused work is a derivative work is properly placed on the 
plaintiff.  Also, the plaintiff is in the best position to adduce evidence of 
whether a market exists and whether it has been or will be exploited. This 
element does not impermissiblely shift the burden of proof rather it 
examines the evidence properly first as to whether the is a derivative work, 
if there is such a work, the court may then reweigh this evidence as a factor 
in the fair use analysis.  Each weighing serves a separate salutary purpose.
1. Midway Mfg, Co., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., & Micro 
Star 
Two cases capture the logical extremes of determining whether an 
accused infringing work is a derivative work in the software context, 
Midway Mfg, Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc,85 and Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. 
Nintendo of America, Inc..86  In Midway Mfg, Co. the plaintiff sold arcade 
style video games that were played in commercial establishments.  
Dedicated players eventually mastered the tricks associated with the game 
and were then able to play for hours without feeding the arcade machine 
more quarters. Alternatively, they became bored with the predictable play 
and lost interest in the game.  In either case, this resulted in a loss of 
revenue for the proprietors of the establishments where these arcade games 
were played.  Defendant sold circuit boards that speeded up the rate of play.  
“Speeding up a video game’s action makes the game more challenging and 
83 See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n. 22 (11th Cir.1996) ( “[I]t is clear the 
burden of proving fair use is always on the putative infringer.”).
84A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991); See Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,  1242 n. 12 (N.D. Cal.  1995) (citing See 2 
William Schwarzer et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 13:47 
(1994) (citing Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 
(N.D.Ga.1986)). But see  William F. Patry, Copyright Law & Practice, 725, 725 n.27 (1994) (citing 
cases).
85
 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. ), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)
86
 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993).
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exciting and increases the licensee’s revenue per game. [P]layers are willing 
to pay an additional price-per-minute in exchange for the challenge and 
excitement of a faster game. .  . .”87
One of the issues before the Midway Mfg, Co. Court was whether the 
speeded up game constituted a derivative work.88  The Court rejected the 
analogy that “[s]peeding up the rate of play of a video game is a little like 
playing of a 45 or 78 revolutions per minute (“RPM’s”) a phonograph 
record recorded at 33 RPM’s.”89  The Court concluded that a dance club 
playing a phonograph record, at a higher rate of speed would not be an 
infringement, because, “there is little if any demand for speeded-up 
records.”90   Then the Court rejected the analogy because there was a 
significant market demand for speeded-up video games.  “As noted, it is 
more exciting to play and it requires some creative effort to produce. For 
that reason, the owner of the copyright on the game should be entitled to 
monopolize it on the same theory that he is entitled to monopolize the 
derivative works specifically listed in Section 101.”91 “It is not obvious 
from [the statutory] language whether a speeded-up video game is a 
derivative work. A speeded-up phonograph record is probably not.”92  “But 
the amount by which the language of [the statutory definition of a derivative 
work] must be stretched to accommodate speeded-up video games is, we 
believe, within the limits which Congress wanted [the Copyright Act] to 
operate.”93
The other extreme is Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 
Inc. The Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. case also addressed whether a device that 
modified a computer game created an infringing derivative work.94  The 
defendant manufactured a device (“Game Genie”) that permitted a player to 
alter up to three features of a Nintendo game.  For example, the Game 
Genie permitted the player to increase the number of lives of the player’s 
character, increase the speed of the character, increase the strength of the 
character, and allow the character to float above obstacles.  The Game 
Genie functioned by blocking the value for a single data byte sent by the 
game cartridge to the central processing unit in the Nintendo Entertainment 
System (“NES”) and replacing it with a new value.95 If that value controlled 
the character’s strength, increasing the value sufficiently would result in an 
invincible character.96  However, the Game Genie did not modify the data 
87
 704 F.2d at 1013.  
88
 704 F.2d at 1013.
89
 704 F.2d at 1013.
90
 704 F.2d at 1013.
91
 704 F.2d at 1014.
92
 704 F.2d at 1014.
93
 704 F.2d at 1014.
94
 964F.2d at 967.
95
 The Game Genie was designed to fit between the NES control deck and the video game 
cartridge.  In order to use the Game Genie, it must be physically attached to a video game cartridge 
and then inserted into the NES control deck.
96
 964 F.2d at 976. The Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) was an 8-bit video game system 
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stored in the game cartridge.  
The Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. Court held that the Game Genie did not 
infringe Nintendo’s right to make derivative works.  The Court found that 
the Copyright Act required that the alleged infringing derivative work be 
fixed.97  The Game Genie merely enhances audiovisual displays and no 
portion of the copyrighted work is ever fixed by the Game Genie. “The 
Game Genie cannot produce an audiovisual display; the underlying display 
must be produced by a [NES] and game cartridge.”98  The Court also 
considered the market. The Court did not examine Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. 
use of the Game Genie.  Rather, the Court examined the use of the Game 
Genie by the end user.  In this case, the end users were consumers who in 
the privacy of their own homes modified the copyright Nintendo game 
cartridges for their own personal pleasure.  There was no evidence of any 
actual or potential public performance of the video game.  Further, 
Nintendo had no present intention of ever marketing a product that would 
compete with the Game Genie.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tried to 
harmonize Midway Mfg, Co. with Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. in Micro Star v. 
Formgen, Inc.99 Micro Star involved a dispute over user-created game 
levels. The plaintiff owned Duke Nukem 3D (“D/N-3D”).100  The game 
came with “twenty-nine levels of play each with different scenery, aliens, 
and other challenges.”101  The game also came with a “Build Editor” to 
permit players to create their own new levels of play. Formgen encouraged 
players to post these new levels of play on the Internet so other players 
would have access to them.  Micro Star, the defendant, downloaded 300 
user-created levels, copied them onto a CD-Rom, and sold them.  D/N-3D 
consists of three components, the game engine, the source art library, and 
the MAP files.   To generate the appropriate audiovisual level, the game 
engine runs the MAP file that describes the audiovisual level and instructs 
the game engine where to place objects from the art library in the 
audiovisual display.  The MAP file describes the level but does not contain 
any copyrightable art.  
Before the Court was whether audiovisual displays created when the 
MAP files ran in conjunction with the game engine and art library were a 
derivative work of the D/N-3D game.102  The answer to this question 
depended on whether the audiovisual work produced by the MAP file was 
in sufficiently concrete or permanent form as to constitute a derivative 
sold between 1985-1995. See Martin Nielsen, The Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) FAQ 
v3.0A, Released : 8th October 1997, http://www.classicgaming.com/museum/faqs/nesfaq.shtml (last 
visited 15 May 2003).
97
 964 F.2d at 969.
98
 964 F.2d at 968.
99 Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); Loren, supra note 22, at 72 -74.   
100 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1109.
101 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1109.
102 Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1110.
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work.103  The Micro Star Court analyzed the opinion in Lewis Galoob 
Toy’s, Inc.  The Lewis Galoob Toy’s, Inc. Court held that “a derivative work 
must incorporate a protected work in some concrete or permanent form.”104
The overarching work in question was the right to create sequels to the 
D/N-3D game.   The audiovisual images created by the Game Genie device 
in Lewis Galoob Toy’s, Inc. were not incorporated in any permanent form, 
“when the game was over, they were gone.”105  The Micro Star Court then 
distinguished the MAP files from the Game Genie device by finding that 
the MAP file was analogous to sheet music.106  Whenever a player uses a 
given MAP file, the game engine uses the same objects from the source art 
library file to create the same audiovisual image.  As a result, the MAP file 
created a sufficient concrete or permanent form of the audiovisual display 
as to create a derivative work.
[DEVELOP]
E. Derivative Works, Integrated Works, and Add-ons, Policy 
Considerations
The difference between an add-on or integrated work and a derivative 
work is often subtle and marginal.  “Because most computer products are 
designed to be interoperable components of larger systems, copyright 
doctrines that regulate the ability of third parties to develop add-ons that 
operate in conjunction with primary products have implications for nearly 
all computer products.”107  “More broadly, any proprietor whose hardware 
or software becomes dominant, or even a relatively common, operating 
environment may wish to impose economic or other controls on access to 
that environment for additional products that interact with it.”108  Courts 
must be careful that the scope of the Copyright Act is not used to grant 
quasi-patent protection to software.
Perhaps the best method of furthering the Congressional determination 
that is espoused in the Copyright Act is to constrain the scope of the § 
102(2) derivative work right by considering the economic policies 
underlying the right to create derivative works.109  These policies are often 
sound in the traditional area of copyright law but may not reflect the reality 
of the software market.  Traditional concerns such as diluting the economic 
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F.2d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1992).
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105
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incentive provided to copyright owners, the effect on the market for the 
original work, and the early dissemination of new works are function 
differently in the modern software market.
1. Economic Incentive
Copyright law in the United States is built on an axiom that its purpose 
is to encourage the progress of learning and not to maximize the wealth of 
copyright owners.110  Copyright policy carefully weighs the public’s interest 
in providing protection to the copyright owner to reward creativity to 
encourage subsequent investment should result in the dissemination of the 
work (knowledge).111  By granting the copyright owner the right to 
authorize derivative works, Congress has greatly increased the scope of the 
copyright estate.  This presumes that the greater the copyright estate, the 
greater the investment in the work and a resulting increase in creative works 
and their dissemination. Correspondingly, the greater the estate the fewer 
the works that will build on the pre-existing work during the copyright term, 
and the more authors are deterred from creating works that may fall within 
the penumbra of the rights granted in this enhanced estate.112 If there is 
market for a bowdlerization or integrated work, and the copyright owner is 
not exploiting this market in a reasonable period, then clearly this economic 
incentive is irrelevant to the investment motivation behind granting the 
derivative work right.
2. Market Harm
A closely related issue is market harm.  This justification considers 
whether the derivative work serves as a market substitute for the pre-
existing work.  Derivative works may discourage investment in the pre-
existing work or even drive the pre-existing work from the market. Either 
eventuality would deny the creator of the original work her economic 
incentive under the Copyright Act.  This market substitution effect 
presupposes that the pre-existing work and the derivative work are 
substantially similar and may serve as substitutes for each other.113  For 
example, if you see the movie or the play, why buy the book?  Each 
experience of the work is separate and stands alone.  You may buy the 
book, but that purchase is unnecessary to enjoy the movie.  But even in this 
old saw of an example, the experience of seeing the play in a theatre with a 
live performance is not clearly a substitute for the Hollywood blockbuster 
110
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interpretation of the book or even for the quiet pleasure of reading the book 
and recreating the characters and events in one’s imagination.  But clearly 
some percentage of the relevant population will view these distinct 
experiences as fungible and as substitutes.
This market substitution policy to protect the copyright owner’s right to 
create derivative works does not appear to be significant in the types of 
works that are under consideration in this Essay.114  For example, this Essay 
presumes that the individual authorizing the derivative work is the lawful 
possessor of a copy of the underlying preexisting work.  In the case of the 
motion pictures under discussion, a legal, authorized copy is purchased then 
modified either virtually or physically to remove offensive content.  In the 
case of integrated works, one presumes that the consumer owns a word 
processing program before buying a spell check program.  There is no 
substitution.  There is a one-to-one correspondence between consuming the 
pre-existing work and the use of the derivative work. The copyright owner 
gets additional sales without any additional investment.115  The copyright 
owner’s incentive to invest in the copyrighted work is not diminished.116  In 
fact, it has increased.  
3. Dissemination of New Works
Some commentators argue that by granting to copyright owners 
derivative work rights, copyright owners are encouraged “to publish” their
work at the first feasible opportunity rather than waiting until copyright 
owners are ready to exploit the market for derivative works.117  This 
concern does not reflect the market reality of software.  Software publishers 
sprint to be the first to market a new product.118  Software publishers would 
prefer to be first than to be the best.  The market environment is such that 
there is a mad rush to market to satisfy the fickle desires of business and 
consumers before the market evaporates.  The “know-how” or trade secrets 
114
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embodied in the software provide a significant advantage once the software 
is on the market.  Competitors will have to expend significant time and 
resources to reverse engineer the pre-existing work before they expend even 
more time and resources to develop the bowdlerization.  While competitors 
are striving to understand the pre-existing work, the copyright owner may 
develop or license to others both right to develop new works and the 
expertise to do so.  Similarly, in the case of motion pictures, the studios 
have a long time advantage to produce a “family” friendly version and the 
ability to sell the family friendly version as part of the normal advertising 
for the video.  No additional incentive besides that provided by the present 
market and that which is inherent in the technology is necessary to assure an 
early diffusion of new software products and to convey a reasonable market 
advantage to the copyright owner.
The purposes behind granting copyright owner’s the right to create 
derivative works support a narrow reading of the breath of the derivative 
work right in the context of digital works because a narrow reading will 
support the creation of new works by the Copyright owner and adequately 
protect the copyright owner’s interest in creating derivative works. While a 
broad open ended, reading would discourage the creating of new works by 
other authors and reduce the legitimate competition in the marketplace for 
innovative digital works.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern Bowdlerizers may be destroying modern digital classics.  
Future generations studying film as literature may question the wisdom of 
bowdlerization, the reputations of the directors, producers, actors, and the 
other talented artists who create films may suffer (in the opinion of those 
only exposed to the Bowdlerized edition), but this is not the type of harm 
that the Copyright Act was designed to prevent, i.e., private alteration for 
personal and family use. Just as in every generation, parents reading to their 
children skipped parts of stories that were age inappropriate or time 
inappropriate (e.g., scary parts before bed time), digital bowdlerizing 
permits parents to accomplish the same goals in a new digital environment. 
Digital bowdlerizing permits parents or other adults to control the time, 
place, and manner of their or their children’s exposure to works that in the 
individual or parent’s unfettered discretion is inappropriate. The difference 
here is one forced on the modern user of digital works, the efficient and 
effective method of skipping the offensive parts requires that the employ 
sophisticated technology, if he or she desires a similar experience that of the 
average user. Most persons desiring these services do not have either the 
time or technical competence to create their own templates. Worse, parents 
would have to subject themselves to offensive content before being able to 
create a template to create a movie suitable for their family viewing.  Thus 
defeating the much of the purpose of the template.
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The copyright owner is free to sell expurgated versions of the work, to 
produce templates to edit offensive content, or take other market or 
technological measures to ameliorate the effects of bowdlerization.  
Nevertheless, just as the copyright owner cannot stop a reader from 
skipping to the last page of a paper book to find “who dunnit” in a mystery 
novel, here the copyright owner may not stop a viewer from fast forwarding 
through content that is offensive or even tedious, as is much gratuitous sex 
and violence in Hollywood produced cinema.  Alternatively, these 
templates could be used to permit the viewer to avoid tedious plot 
development and tendentious subplots in favor of sex, blood and gore, just 
as generations of readers skipped though classic novels and great literature 
looking for the “good spots.” In either case, its viewer’s or reader’s choice, 
and copyright law should not be extended to grant statutory control over 
private uses of copyrighted work. 
